The Theory of Anything

Bruce has made a controversial claim on this show: today's "CritRats" (Critical Rationalists on X) have drifted from what Popper intended. And surprisingly, some of the drift traces back to David Deutsch's reinterpretation of Popper in an attempt to solve real problems with Popper's original epistemology.

In this episode, Bruce unpacks exactly how — tracing the key points where Deutsch and Popper diverge: verisimilitude, demarcation, testability vs. criticism, and what "refutation" actually meant to Popper (hint: not what you think). A sympathetic but rigorous look at where "Deutschianism" improves on "Popperianism" and where it quietly smuggles in new problems.

This week we were honored to interview Ray Scott Percival, a significant but also woefully under-appreciated figure in critical rationalism. Percival has been active in critical rationalist forums, conferences, and academic journals since the 90s and before. He has written for Quillette. He was the editor of a book of critical responses to Steven Pinker. He created an excellent documentary film called Liberty Loves Reason. But most significantly, in 2012 he wrote a book called Myth of the Closed Mind, which is available on Amazon in all the formats, including audio. The basic idea he explores there is that humans care about truth. We are truth seekers that create and pass on both rational and irrational memes. Dawkins calls the worst of these memes “mind viruses,” but what Percival points out is that as flawed as humans are, the good kind of memes have a competitive advantage in the war of ideas. Such a simple idea, but the implications of this are profound, and Percival has spent a lifetime wresting with them.

This week we had the pleasure of interviewing Michael Golding, M.D, who is a psychiatric physician. He is also heavily influenced by the philosophical ideas of David Deutsch and Karl Popper. At one point he calls himself a proponent of homeschooling and Taking Children Seriously. Together we wrestle with what critical rationalism and the universal explainer hypothesis suggests about mental illness and human creativity.

Bruce examines how effectively critical rationalism can ground the non-aggression principle (NAP)—the libertarian idea that, in some formulation, it is morally wrong to initiate violence.

But does it really make sense to interpret all areas of law through this single principle? Might it be better replaced by an alternative, such as a principle of least coercion? And what, from a critical rationalist perspective, does coercion actually mean? Is it a theory with substantial moral content, or an easy-to-vary principle that ultimately collapses into “coercion is whatever I dislike”?

And how might we test between these alternating views?

Bonus: What did Karl Popper think of Thomas Szasz's theories?

In this video podcast, Bruce makes his boldest statement yet about probability. He dives into David Deutsch’s lecture “Physics Without Probability”—as well as our Episode 100 interview with Deutsch—to unpack the core argument.

Bruce carefully works through the mathematical details of Deutsch’s claim that probability is merely a “flat-earth approximation.” As best as he can make sense of it, however, the argument just doesn’t add up. In fact, Bruce concludes that Deutsch’s own reasoning seems to imply that probability is not at all comparable to a flat-earth approximation.

From there, he methodically explores whether this long-running debate about probability is really a case of word essentialism—an argument over definitions rather than a substantive difference.

He closes with an impassioned plea: if someone out there truly understands Deutsch’s argument, please help him pinpoint exactly where he’s going wrong.

This week, Bruce looks at how much critical rationalists do—and do not—subject their proposed best theories to critical testing. Bruce wrestles with how we apply the tools of critical rationalism—fallibilism, argument/debate, the demarcation criteria, falsification, and so on—to our real world ideas about economics, politics, and other issues.

To do this, Bruce asks these question: Isn't economics famously difficult, or even impossible, to test? Does that mean it is a metaphysical theory? Doesn't Popper's famous demarcation criteria force us to accept that label? And what about Praxeology and Anarcho Capitalism?

In our shortest episode ever, Bruce continues his exploration of the concept of concepts by looking at "knowledge" as a concept rather than a theory. And of course along the the way he pushes back again several critical rationalist dogmas.

Bruce looks at what makes sense—and doesn’t—about popular theories on knowledge promoted by CritRats (critical rationalists on X). He looks at how much these theories align, and don’t align, with what David Deutsch has actually said about knowledge.

A curious Twitter exchange with David Deutsch prompts Bruce to explore what Deutsch and other critical rationalists mean when they assert that randomness doesn’t truly exist.

In this episode, Bruce explores his extended conversation with philosopher and inductivist Kieren, focusing on Kieren’s claim that Popper’s Critical Rationalism ultimately depends on induction.

Bruce then makes a striking counter-claim: that Kieren’s entire argument amounts to stripping all substantive content from his “theory” of induction and turning it into an unfalsifiable concept—essentially a word game, a kind of argument-by-tautology designed to immunize the theory from criticism. Or put another way, Kieren is turning his theory into a concept because concepts are unfalsifiable.

This leads Bruce into a deeper examination of what induction actually is—and what it isn’t. Why is “induction” such a confusing, multidimensional idea? What is the real point of contention between critical rationalists and inductivists? Did Popper truly lack a notion of “support,” as Kieren argues? And what did Popper actually say about justification—did he really reject every form of it?

And to make things even more provocative: do CritRats rely on similar linguistic maneuvers to shield their own favored theories from criticism?

Here Bruce starts with Popper’s assertion that theories are 100x more valuable than concepts and compares it to Douglas Hofstadter’s ideas on creativity and consciousness. But if concepts matter so little, where do conjectures originate? Popper offers little on this point, yet Hofstadter’s view of the human mind as a system of self-referential feedback loops—able to bridge gaps that formal logic cannot—may provide a useful way to think about it.

And while we’re at it, let’s poke at one of the CritRats’ sacred cows: is it actually the case that observations have no role other than helping us pick between rival theories?

What is a concept? What is a theory? And was Karl Popper right when he said theories are “100 times more valuable” than concepts? But where do conjectures come from?

We go over Popper's own writing about concepts and his explanation for why he feels they are less valuable than theories.

Does this prove Bruce wrong from back in episode 112 where he claimed concepts are more valuable than words? What would Popper say?

aka "The Popper vs Campbell Beatdown!"

At long last! The showdown you've all been waiting for! These two giants of epistemology meet in the ring and fight it out for dominance!

Bruce continues his exploration of evolutionary epistemology, or the idea that all knowledge creation in nature is analogous to natural selection. Specifically, Bruce discusses how Karl Popper’s critical rationalism is—and is not—related to Donald Campbell’s concept of evolutionary epistemology, which it seems Popper mostly endorsed. But is Popper’s conjecture and refutation really the same as Campbell’s blind variation and selective retention? And would Popper have agreed with David Deutsch that "All an animal's knowledge is in its genes?" (In fact, Popper explicitly answers that question! Multiple times! Tune in to find out!)

Bruce compares Donald Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology and David Deutsch’s ideas on infinite knowledge growth. What is knowledge growth? Is it a rare thing limited to only biological evolution and human ideas, as Deutsch seems to argue? (Does he argue that?) Or is it a ubiquitous process that happens all around us at all levels of nature as Campbell argues?

Is knowledge created in human minds an incremental process, as Campbell might emphasize, based on blind variation and selection? Or as Deutsch might emphasize, is this a cosmically significant, open-ended process based on creativity and explanation? Can these two great thinkers ideas be reconciled or are they in contradiction to each other?

In this shorter episode Bruce takes a deep dive into logical fallacies. How useful are logical fallacies? Does pointing out a logical fallacy help correct errors? Does doing so make us more rational? Can we become more logical by avoiding ad hominem attacks, not straw-manning or appealing to authority, and avoiding slippery slopes? And is there a difference between a logical fallacy and a rational fallacy? If so, which is more important?

In our previous episode covering Strevens' critique of Popper, we briefly touched on why Bruce believes it it a mistake for CritRats to say they don't believe in beliefs.

This time Bruce takes a deep dive into beliefs -- and walks back his previous statement a bit.

Do humans need beliefs? Are beliefs dangerous? What is the critical rationalist position on beliefs? What did Popper say? And can we even realistically live without beliefs?

And along the way, Bruce criticizes "the disobedience criteria" as a way to make his point about the value -- and dangers -- of mythic belief systems and why we need them and why they can confuse us rationally.

Bruce first explains the difference between arguing over concepts vs arguing over words.

Then Bruce examines assertions about probability and randomness in the critical rationalist community. Why does David Deutsch insist that there is no such thing as 'randomness'? What does the many worlds interpretation really say about this? Is all 'randomness' really just pseudo-randomness? Is this really a conflict between concepts or just an argument over words?

What precisely is a static vs dynamic society? It is possible to take this down to the level of machine learning? Could this distinction turn into a testable theory? What are the alternatives to what Deutsch proposes? Is Deutsch's theory of static societies testable? What exactly is a culture or criticism and how is this intertwined with the Enlightenment? Which came first: the Enlightenment or the Scientific Revolution?

We once again get together some of the smartest people we know for a discussion that gets into foundational issues, this time in the form of the classic battle between the dystopian novels 1984 and Brave New World. But it was really much less of a debate than a discussion in line with Popper’s defining principle of critical rationalism: “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.”Guests: Vaden Masrani (Increments podcast, X: @Vaden Masrani) Sam Kuypers (X: @Sam_kuyp) David Wainwright

This week we are joined by fellow traveler Dan Gish to discuss LLMs and AGI. Does it really, truly make sense to think that OpenAI or DeepMind are not at least an important stepping stone towards the creation of human-level creativity? What does it mean when CritRats assert that these AI algorithms are the opposite of human intelligence because they are obedient whereas we are disobedient?

Here we discuss fidesim and critical rationalism. Fideism has many definitions, but at least how we are thinking of it, it is the idea that something like faith has validity in the process of moving closer to truth through reason.

This week we discuss a short interview with Karl Popper from 1969 where he discusses God and religion. Specifically, he makes a case for agnosticism, asserts that all men are religious, and discusses the problem of evil. We use this as a starting point to consider if we live in an inherently meaningful universe or one ruled by something like entropy. We discuss arguments for the former related to fine tuning, causation, and beauty.

Bonus: Bruce proclaims himself one of those much hated Fideists! (A group disliked by both rationalists and religionists alike.)

This week Bruce speaks about the work or Michael Levin, who is a biologist know for his work on cell cognition and collective intelligence or the idea that electrical signals between cells influence the formation of biological systems. His work has potentially massive implications in cancer research and other fields.

Though rarely identified with 3rd way evolution, his work has more than a passing similarity to it. Like 3rd way evolutionists, he seeks to expand evolutionary theory beyond the alleged reductionism of a gene-centric or neo-Darwinian approach. Presumably, these bioelectric effects could be considered a kind of epigenetic or evolutionary process existing outside the genome.

However, unlike the 3rd Way evolutionists, he's ready to back up his views with clever and shocking experiments that confront popular interpretations of gene-centric evolution head on.

Can Levin's work possibly help us determine who is more right in the argument between 3rd Way evolutionists like Denis Noble or James Shapiro vs mainstream evolutionary biologists like Zach Hancock?

How well do the collection of assertions called “3rd way evolution” stand up to criticism? Here, in our second of at least 3 episodes on this topic, Bruce considers the criticisms of Denis Noble and James Shapiro by YouTuber and evolutionary biologist Zach Hancock in his epic video on the subject.  Perhaps the role of epigenetics is overstated, Lamarckism is not back,  and neo-Darwinism is not dead after all.

This week we discuss neo-Darwinism vs post-Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism meaning a gene centric view of evolution, which is also called the great synthesis since it unifies natural selection with genetics and paleontology and perhaps even human psychology.

Post-Darwinism is a view that emphasizes factors outside random mutation, like epigenetics or the assertion that organisms and cells can alter their own genome in a beneficial way.

Here Bruce specifically concentrates on the work of biologist James Shapiro’s critical look at Richard Dawkins’ neo-Darwinism.We consider, does it really make sense to see our bodies and minds as tools governed by our masters DNA? Does post-Darwinism, also called “third way evolution,” offer a meaningful alternative to both neo-Darwinism and the theism of intelligent design? Does this way of looking at biology say something about the very nature of reality and the laws of physics?

This is part 1 of a loose series. Part 2 will cover criticisms of Noble and Shapiro. Part 3 will cover the work of Michael Levin. However, you don't really need to listen to them in order and we provide context each time.

This time we discuss Nassim Nicholas Taleb's article "IQ is Largely a Pseudoscientific Swindle" -- a title whose compliment is that he's claiming IQ is a bit scientifically valid. But which bits does he claim are valid?

We use this article as a springboard to consider: Do the numbers produced by an IQ test say something meaningful or useful about human minds? Would these tests be better off in the dustbin of history? Are they ever useful? And is there overlap between Taleb's take on IQ and the negative view of these tests held by many critical rationalists? What does Taleb agree (or disagree) with CritRats over when it comes to IQ?

Bruce takes a deep dive into Stephen Wolfram’s ideas regarding computational universality, which may go further than the Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis in that Wolfram’s theories imply that all of nature could be simulated even by relatively simple systems, so even nature itself may be computational rather than something that can just be simulated on a turning machine or quantum computer. Stephen Wolfram is a renowned physicist, computer scientists, and entrepreneur.

Bruce also talks about the related ideas on philosophy of computation promoted by Rudy Rucker, who is a mathematician, computer scientist, and science fiction author associated with cyberpunk genre. Both thinkers believe, rightly or wrongly, that the complexity of life and the universe can be explained by relatively simple computational rules.

Our Christmas gift to you this year is episode 100: an interview with The Man (TM) himself!

Bruce stumbles over himself fan-boying as he asks all his burning (but geeky) questions about cosmology, the omega point, and probability. How do Deutsch and Tipler differ on optimistic end-time cosmology? Is the Omega point refuted by observation (Deutsch) or not (Tipler)? Does heat death contradict the principle of optimism? Is it a bummer? Does stochasticity really not exist? And is it rational to wear a mask during COVID? How do you apply epistemology to a question like that when you lack enough data to severely test your theories but still need to make a decision?

Peter asks: Are free will and downward causation related? Do our genes attempt to coerce us? Why are explanatory and computational universality so confusing? And what if studies show that authoritative parenting is best for children?

AKA "David Deutsch DESTORYS the Simulation Hypothesis"

Bruce take a deep dive into solipsism in the form of the brain in a vat thought experiment, Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis, and related ideas. Does the Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis suggest we could live in a simulation? What does critical rationalism say about these theories?

We take a deep dive into Karl Popper’s philosophical ideas about music that he outlines in four chapters in this intellectual autobiography Unended Quest:

• “Music,”
• Speculations about the Rise of Polyphonic Music,”
• “Two Kinds of Music,” and
• “Progressivism in Art, Especially in Music.” 

We are joined by Peter’s brother, Chris Johansen, who is a straight-ahead jazz tenor saxophonist living in NYC. 

We discuss how Popper’s ideas on classical music intersect with Chris’s ideas on jazz, as well as the role of conservatism in music. We examine how Popper’s thinking on music influenced his concept of the 3 worlds and his ideas on such concepts as dogmatism, essentialism, and historicism. 

Plus, you get Bruce's rant about the importance of constraints in music, science, criticism, and Popper's epistemology. Bruce argues that absent at least the attempt to outline epistemological conventions (i.e. constraints) you can't error correct Popper's epistemology and you lose what makes it special.

Here we interview AI researcher Kenneth Stanley, who makes the case that in complex systems, pursing specific objectives can actually be counterproductive. Instead, whether in machine learning, business, science, education, or art, we should pursue what is interesting. It is in this search for novelty—fueled by curiosity—where innovation and open-ended knowledge creation occurs.

Get Ken's book!

Forgive the clickbait title. The episode should probably actually be called "The (Lack of) Problem of Induction" because we primarily cover Popper's refutation of induction in C&R Chapter 8.

This episode starts our deep dive into answering the question "What is the difference between a good philosophical explanation and a bad explanation?"

To answer that question we go over Karl Popper's "On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics" from his book Conjectures and Refutations Chapter 8. In this chapter Popper first explains why he believes 'there is no such thing as induction' (from page 18 of Logic of Scientific Discovery) by offering his historical and logical refutation of induction.

In this episode we go over Popper's refutation of induction in chapter 8 of C&R in detail and then compare it to Tom Mitchell's (of Machine Learning fame) argument of the 'futility of bias free learning.' We show that Mitchell's and Popper's arguments are actually the same argument even though Mitchell argues for the existence of a kind of induction as used in machine learning.

Bruce argues that the difference is not a conceptual or theoretical difference but just a difference in use of language and that the two men are actually conceptually fully in agreement. This makes machine learning both a kind of 'induction' (though not the kind Popper refuted) and also gives machine learning an interesting and often missed relationship with critical rationalism.

Then Bruce asks the most difficult question of all: "Is there anyone out there in the world other than me that is interested in exploring how to apply Karl Popper's epistemology to machine learning like this?"